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TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
SUCH TIPS MUST MEET AGUILAR STANDARDS
EVEN WHEN PARTIALLY CORROBORATED
BY INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION*
In recent years the entire area of search and seizure has been
subjected to closer scrutiny by reviewing courts. Beginning with
the oft-noted' case of Mapp v. Ohio,2 every case dealing with
search and seizure has witnessed a further excursion of courts
into a once-neglected area. Although Ker v. California3 held
that the states themselves could establish standards for determin-
ing the reasonableness of a search, subject to review only by the
Supreme Court, Aguilar v. TexaS4 held the standards for ob-
taining search warrants to be the same under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. If a search was conducted under an in-
valid search warrant, and the situation was one in which a bona
fide search warrant was obviously required, that search would
be unreasonable.5 It is difficult, moreover, to envision a situation
in which a search could be found "reasonable" on review by the
United States Supreme Court if the warrant which authorized
the search were held invalid. Because the Supreme Court has an
apparent desire for federal standards to control more areas of
criminal procedure, the states6 now appear to be bound under the
new federal standards pertaining to the issuance of a search
warrant set forth in Spinelli v. United States.7
* Spinelli v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969).
1. See Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. Rv.
185 (1961); Knowlton, The Supreme Court, Mapp v. Ohio and Due Process
of Law, 49 IowA L. REv. 14 (1963); Morris, The End of an Experiment in
Fedcralism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WAs H. L. REv. 407 (1961) ; Sloane
& Leedes, A Mapp for the Road Towards Exclusion, 35 TFnsp. L.Q. 27 (1961-
62) ; Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuE LJ. 319.
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
4. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
5. Cf. Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964).
6. The federal standard for determination of probable cause was held to
control the states. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
7. 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969).
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Generally, with some exceptions,8 a warrant is required to
search private property.9 The fourth amendment 0 requires that
search warrants be issued only upon probable cause.11 Unless
arbitrary, the magistrate's finding that probable cause exists has
been said to be conclusive. 12 In practice, however, this finding of
probable cause is subject to considerable review if there is a
trial.13
Probable cause has been said to have been sufficiently shown
in an affidavit if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would
be led to believe and would conscientiously entertain a strong
suspicion that an offense has been committed or that the accused
is guilty of an offense.' 4 Although this is the typical judicial
definition of probable cause, probable cause may sometimes be
determined from the standpoint of the officer, with his special
skill and knowledge, rather than from that of the ordinary
citizen in the same situation.15 Thus, a police officer may detect
the odor of opium smoke, and due to his special ability to recog-
nize such an odor, an inference may arise that illegal activity is
occurring. Mere suspicion by the police, however, will not be
8. A search may be made without a warrant when: (1) there is a valid
consent to the search, United States v. Dornblut, 261 F2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217
(1960) ; (2) the search is incident to a lawful arrest, Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; (3) there is an impending danger that requires immediate
search, District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Such
impending danger exists when: (a) evidence or contraband is threatened with
removal or destruction, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948)
(dictum); Hernandez v. United States, 353 F2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965) ; (b) a
policeman responds to an emergency call for aid, McDonald v. United States,
353 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) (dictum) ; (c) for some other reason there can be
no delay and a judge is unavailable, cf. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948).
9. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
10. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Probable cause is required for a search with or without a warrant. The
standards for the determination of probable cause are no less stringent in both
instances. See United States v. Peisner, 311 F2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962) ; cf. John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
12. Evans v. United States, 242 F2d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 1957).
13. See, e.g., Schoeneman v. United States, 317 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
14. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
15. United States v. Sebo, 101 F2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1939).
1969]
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enough to establish probable cause.' All the evidence within
the officer's knowledge may be considered in the determination
of probable cause, even though that evidence would not be ad-
missible in a trial.17 Thus, hearsay may be sufficient,' if it is
corroborated by facts within the officer's personal knowledge
which would lead him to credit the hearsay or cause a reasonably
suspicious person to believe it to be true.' 9
Although the determination of probable cause is a broad, fac-
tual determination and decided cases are helpful in establishing
guidelines only insofar as they present similar facts,2 0 there are
certain procedural steps with which the officer must always
comply in order to obtain a search warrant.21 For a search war-
rant to be issued, an affidavit which states facts sufficient to
establish probable cause must be submitted.22 If the validity of
16. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); United
States v. Dixon, 334 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v. Pepe, 209
F. Supp. 329 (D. Del. 1962).
17. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In light of the statement
that probable cause is "substantially" the same for an arrest warrant as for a
search warrant in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), one
wonders whether instances giving rise to probable cause to arrest can be the
basis for probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant.
Some possible factors in this area are: 1. Geographical area (defendant was
recognized by police while traveling from a known source of supply of illegal
liquor toward a probable illicit market) Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). 2. Previous criminal activity (officer's knowledge of past crim-
inal activity when coupled with credible informant's tip and subsequent fleeing
of defendant gave rise to probable cause) Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694 (1931). 3. Furtive conduct (defendant's fleeing mnay be sufficient corrobo-
ration of hearsay informant's tip to give probable cause) Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 4. Sense impressions: (a) Sight of illegal activ-
ity or contraband obviously gives probable cause; (b) smell (not sufficient
when it alone is relied on in illegal whiskey cases) Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610 (1961) ; but smell may be sufficient in other situations (officers
smelled opium smoke, but arrest was invalidated on hypertechnical grounds
that, at time of entry, officers did not have probable cause to suspect the
defendant specifically, since they were unaware of the number and identity of
the occupants) Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); (c) hearing
(rejected in one case when officers heard the sound of adding machines
through the window of a suspected lottery operator) McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
18. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
19. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110 (1965).
20. United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 850 (1960).
21. It has long been established that a magistrate is to make the determina-
tion of probable cause necessary for a search and not the officer involved in
the detection of the crime. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
22. See generally Fmn. R. Cans. P. 41(b) ; S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 4-414, -415
(1962). For an excellent discussion of the status of search and seizure in South
Carolina, see also Note, Search and Seizure-A Constitutional Standard for
South Carolina, 17 S.C.L. REv. 687 (1965).
[Vol. 21
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an affidavit is questioned, it cannot be upheld on grounds of
subsequent or extrinsic evidence, but must be justified on its
face.23 The Supreme Court has established guidelines to aid in
determining whether these procedural steps have been properly
followed. The landmark case of Aguilar v. Texas24 delineates
the two important guidelines for the determination of probable
cause, when the basis for probable cause is an informant's tip.
In Aguilar, the Court held that an affidavit based on an in-
former's tip which is conclusory in nature cannot, in itself,
be the basis for probable cause. 25 The conclusory affidavit 26
in Aguilar was deemed inadequate on what was described in
Spinelli, as a "two-pronged" test. The affidavit was inadequate
because, first, it failed to set forth any of the underlying circum-
stances necessary to enable the magistrate to judge the validity
of the informant's conclusion, and secondly, it disclosed no basis
for the affiant's belief that the informant was a credible person
or that his information was reliable.
Although adhering to Aguilar in principle, many courts have
used a "totality of the circumstances" approach to justify deter-
minations of probable cause.2 7 Under this view, probable cause
may arise from the "totality" of the facts disclosed in an affi-
davit, even though each allegation, in itself, would be insufficient
to establish probable cause. On this basis the Eighth Circuit
justified the search which led to the conviction of William
Spinelli.
28
William Spinelli was convicted of violating Title 18, Section
1952, of the United States Code, by engaging in travel from an
23. This has been called the "Four-Comers Doctrine." Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Baysden v. United States, 271 F2d 325 (4th
Cir. 1959); United States v. Sims, 201 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
24. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
25. Accord, State v. York, 250 S.C. 30, 156 S.E2d 326 (1967); State v.
Hill, 245 S.C. 76, 138 S.E.2d 829 (1964).
26. The relevant portion of the affidavit in Aguilar stated that:
Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person
and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other nar-
cotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above de-
scribed premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the
provisions of the law.
378 U.S. at 109.
27. United States v. Pinkerman, 374 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1967) ; United States
v. Whiting, 311 F2d 191 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963);
United States v. Joseph, 278 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1960); United States v. Delia,
283 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ; United States v. Lewis, 270 F. Supp. 807
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Commonwealth v. Brown, 237 N.E2d 53 (Mass. 1968).
28. Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967).
1969]
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Illinois suburb to St. Louis, Missouri, with the intention of con-
ducting illegal gambling activities. Spinelli challenged the con-
stitutionality of the search warrant which authorized the search
that uncovered the evidence necessary for his conviction. The
affidavit alleged that: (1) Spinelli was observed on more than
one occasion entering St. Louis, Missouri, from Illinois, parking
at an apartment house and entering a particular apartment; (2)
telephone company records indicated that the telephones within
the apartment were listed in the name of Grace P. Hagen and
had the numbers WY 4-0029 and WY 4-0136; (3) Spinelli was
a known gambler and associate of gamblers; (4) the FBI was
informed by a confidential, reliable informant that Spinelli was
operating a bookmaking establishment by means of two tele-
phones numbered WY 4-0029 and WY 4-0136. The United States
Supreme Court held that these facts did not give rise to probable
cause and that the search warrant was improperly issued.
In Spine li v. United States,w 2 9 the Court was dealing with a
new, but not completely unforseen ° problem of the weight to
be accorded conclusory statements of an informant's tip when
these statements are partially corroborated by an independent
investigation. 31 In reviewing this problem the Court held that
the "totality of the circumstances" approach was too broad
and that
[a] magistrate cannot be said to have properly dis-
charged his constitutional duty if he relies on an in-
formant's tip which-even when partially corroborated
- is not as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's
requirements when standing alone.3 2
Thus, an informant's tip, when presented in a conclusory
affidavit, cannot be the basis for a warrant to be issued--even
when partially corroborated by an independent investigation-
29. 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969).
30. It was generally recognized that some corroboration of the informant's
statements was needed. It was not generally recognized that an independent
investigation which only partially corroborated conclusionary statements by an
informant would not be sufficient to establish probable cause. See generally
Comment, The Federal Standard-The New State Law of Search and Seizure,
19 ARK. L. REv. 329, 332 (1966); Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis
for Probable Cause in the Federal Courts, 53 CAz.u. L. REv. 840 (1965).
31. In Aguilar the Court noted that if the conclusory statements in the
affidavit had been buttressed by "the facts and results of ... a surveillance
[independent investigation] ... this would, of course, present an entirely
different case." 378 U.S. at 109 n.1.
32. 89 S. Ct. at 589.
[VoL 21
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unless the other allegations in the affidavit independently
establish probable cause or the tip meets Aguilar standards. The
question then arises, what standards are set forth in Aguilar?
The Court stated that one purpose of Spinell is to clarify the
requirements of Aguilar. The Court then outlined what stan-
dards a reviewing magistrate should follow when receiving an
affidavit in which probable cause is based in part on an in-
formant's tip.
For an informant's tip to establish probable cause, first and
most importantly, some of the underlying circumstances which
would enable the magistrate to judge the validity of the in-
formant's conclusion must be set forth. This is the first prong
of the two-pronged test of Aguilar. If this prong is to be com-
plied with, there must be some evidence that the informant has
observed the illegal conduct himself, or that he has heard of the
conduct from the guilty party or from someone who is also
likely to know of the illegal activity.
38
For the second prong of Aguilar to be complied with, there
must be some evidence to support the affiant's belief that the
informant is a credible person and his information reliable. It
appears that these requirements may be met if the affiant dis-
closes that the informant's information has been reliable in the
past. When the informant is new and the tip in question is his
first, then this requirement may be somewhat of an obstacle. For
the most part, however, the credibility of the informant will
generally be proven by a sworn statement of past reliability and
will constitute no particular obstacle to the issuance of a search
warrant.
The two-pronged test of reliability of the informant and un-
derlying circumstances on which the conclusion is based, may
sometimes be met if there is such a specificity of detail that the
magistrate could reasonably infer that the conclusion is sound.
33. Whether this requirement of detail will affect the ability of police to use
informants, particularly in the area of narcotics and gambling violations, is
presently unknown. It can be suggested that there will be an increasing unwil-
lingness on the part of informants to divulge such detailed information. Once
the facts set out in the affidavit are made known to the defendant, it is very
likely that the defendant would then be able to ascertain who "squealed." It
would be naive to deny that in some instances there would be severe reprisals
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Justice Harlan, in the majority opinion,3 4 pointed out that
for the purpose of establishing probable cause, for an arrest or
a search, Draper v. United Statess5 provides an example of the
type of detailed information required.
In Draper, an informant named Hereford stated to police of-
ficers that Draper would return to Denver on a certain train
bringing narcotics with him. Hereford then described with
great particularity how Draper would be dressed without stating
how he had obtained his information. This information was
said to give rise to probable cause for an arrest and therefore
the subsequent search was valid. 6
Tht facts of Draper are similar to those of oC/ray v. Ili-
noi8. 7 In MeC ray police officers were told by an informant
that McCray had heroin on his person and could be found in the
vicinity of 47th Street and Calumet Avenue in Chicago. The
officers proceeded to that area, found and arrested McCray,
and the search incident to the arrest uncovered heroin. At the
hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence, the arresting
officers testified that the informant involved had enabled them
to attain 15 or 16 convictions. On this basis the United States
Supreme Court concluded that, "[t]here can be no doubt, upon
the basis of the circumstances related ... that there was prob-
able cause to sustain the arrest and incidental search in this
case."
38
These cases illustrate that personal opinion intertwined with
factual analysis is used in the determination of probable cause.
This use of personal opinion and factual analysis was under-
34. The Spinelli decision is unusual in several notable aspects. The Court
split 5-3 (Justice Marshall abstained) and Justice White voted with the
majority only to avoid an affirmance due to an equally divided court. In
dissent were Justices Black and Fortas, which, due to their differing constitu-
tional philosophies, is most unusual. Finally, the majority opinion was written
by Justice Harlan and seems to be antithetical to his own constitutional views.
For a discussion of Justice Harlan's constitutional philosophy in this area, see
Ledbetter, Mr. Justice Harlan: Due Process and Civil Liberties, 20 S.C.L.
Rv. 389 (1968).
35. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
36. It is interesting to note that the Court has often demanded more evidence
to establish probable cause for officers working without a warrant than is
necessary to justify the issuance of a warrant. See Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948). This has been described as evincing the Court's preference
for officers working with a warrant. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
106 (1965).
37. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
38. Id. at 304.
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scored in Spinelli by the conclusion of dissenting Justice Fortas
that, "such facts and circumstances are present in this case .... 5*9
Justice Black, also in dissent, stated his views more strongly. He
believed Spinelli to be a departure from past principles laid
down in former cases, notably United States v. Ventresea.40 In
that decision the Court stated:
If the teachings of the Co-urt's cases are to be followed
and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for
search warrants.. . must be tested and interpreted by
magistrates and courts in a common sense and realistic
fashion . . . . Technical requirements of elaborate
specificity once exacted under common law pleadings
have no proper place in this area.41
In iSpinelli, the Supreme Court has re-emphasized its often
taken position that the determination of probable cause is not
to be made by the police officer, but shall be made by a magis-
trate. The magistrate is to form a protective barrier between
the citizen and the police, thereby insuring that the citizen's
constitutional rights will be fully recognized and protected.
These rights are not protected when the magistrate is a mere
rubber stamp for the police. In Spinelli, the Court has re-
avowed that this goal will be reached.
There can be no doubt that in the future, for a search war-
rant's issuance to be upheld, the police must have presented
sufficient evidence in the affidavit to enable a magistrate to
determine that probable cause exists. The fruits of the search
warrant cannot be used to validate the existence of probable
cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a warrant. Therefore,
when the basis for probable cause is an informant's tip, there
must be compliance with the two-pronged test of Aguilar. Some
of the underlying facts and circumstances from which the in-
formant concluded that an offense was committed must be made
available to the magistrate, and the affiant must state why the
informant is thought by the police to be reliable. If this test
is not complied with, the other allegations in the affidavit must
independently give rise to probable cause.42 In any event it
39. Spinelli v. United States, 89 S. Ct 584, 600 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
40. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
41. Id. at 108.
42. If other allegations in a search warrant affidavit give rise to probable
cause, then conclusory statements of the informant may be disregarded as
surplusage. See United States v. Whiting, 311 F2d 191 (4th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
19691
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appears that the Supreme Court has deemed that the "totality
of the circumstances" approach is not a precise enough analysis
of the facts and is not to be used to determine the existence of
probable cause in these circumstances.
The Spinelli decision can be viewed as requiring increasing
specificity of detail when an informant's tip is to be the basis
for probable cause and the issuance of a warrant, or an arrest
without a warrant. Whether this decision evinces such a "nega-
tive attitude by reviewing courts [as] will tend to discourage
police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial




43. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
44. There is some evidence that present police practice does not reflect the
judicial preference for search warrants that courts express. In Detroit (1956-
63), there were 288 search warrants of which 244 were used to obtain gamb-
ling paraphernalia. This data suggests that police only use search warrants
when it gives them a unique advantage. Otherwise they concentrate on the
search incident to a lawful arrest. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYr., & D. RoTEN-
BERG, DEmcrION OF CIME 101-02 (1967).
[Vol. 21
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